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Reliability is of vital importance for distributed software application and should be ensured in 
all stages of the development cycle. Ensuring a high level of reliability for distributed soft-
ware applications leads to competitive applications which increase the level of user satisfac-
tion. The aim of this paper is to present techniques and methods which ensure high level of re-
liability. A model for estimating the reliability through risk assessment is presented. Distrib-
uted software applications are composed of multiple components spread across multiple het-
erogeneous platforms and partial failures are inherent. To ensure high reliability is very im-
portant that the input data for distributed application components are correct and complete. 
Keywords: Distributed Applications, Reliability Model, Risk Assessment, Data Acquisition 
 
Introduction 
Reliability refers to the ability of a soft-
ware application to maintain the performance 
level in a certain environment for a specified 
period of time. In [7] reliability represents 
the characteristic of the informatics applica-
tion to run correctly and completely for all 
data sets inputted by the users. A reliable dis-
tributed application is defined in [2] as a sys-
tem whose behavior is predictable, in spite of 
partial failures, asynchrony, and reconfigura-
tion.  
Reliability shows [4] the level in which a 
program conducts to correct and complete re-
sults. An estimated reliability is found which 
refers to the software product behavior who 
is in one of the phases of development and 
more than that the effective reliability, IF, 
which is calculated as a report between the 
number of success running, NS, and the total 
number of iterations, NT, of the software 
product: 
       (1) 
During all stages of developing of a comput-
er application, starting with product design 
and continuing through implementation, test-
ing, product obsolescence, post-production, 
reliability is assured every step by choosing 
the right technologies and ensuring a proper 
technical training and expertise of people in-
volved in the product development. 
In Figure 1 is presented the reliability engi-
neering with the major activities of the prod-
uct development cycle: 
 
 
Fig. 1. Reliability engineering 
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Application users are interested in high relia-
bility software products, since the purpose of 
reliability is [10]: 
•  to analyze the defects identified in the 
testing phase; learning the causes that 
lead to the arise of the problems, which 
were the processes involved, what meth-
ods of control must be applied to remove 
and prevent their future occurrence;  
•  to provide a quantitative understanding 
of the application behavior over time, 
depending on the internal and external 
influence factors, such as the maximum 
number X of server processes that can be 
used to achieve a number of Y transac-
tions during Z period; when these limits 
are exceeded the performance signifi-
cantly decreases; 
•  to establish methods and models for cal-
culating and forecasting the reliability, 
by monitoring application behavior dur-
ing a certain period of time in a real op-
erating environment; 
•  to establish methods for maintaining and 
enhancing the reliability of future dis-
tributed applications; 
•  to establish methods for selecting and 
processing data on products reliability 
and to determine the optimal values of 
reliability indicators. 
The effects that occur in the context of a lack 
of reliability of software products should not 
be neglected; depending on the application 
usage, they have very important economic 
implications, by producing additional 
maintenance costs and increasing the number 
of resources needed for solving the defects; 
they also determine failure to comply with 
deadlines, or may even endanger human 
lives, in case of defects appearing to the rail-
way switchgear system. 
Reliability of distributed applications re-
quires both a qualitative and quantitative ap-
proach [10]: 
•  qualitative approach refers to the ability 
of the information system to meet the 
specified requirements, in the defined 
environmental conditions, and proper 
functioning in a preset time; important 
qualitative indicators are: the ability to 
resist failures, the ability to recover after 
failure due to a system crash or a power 
failure; this is achieved through very 
well designed error recovery or backup 
systems; 
•  quantitative approach means achieving 
the designed functions and delivery of 
all duties without fault and with a certain 
performance, in a given period of time; it 
is based on numerical indicators, ob-
tained through comparison with other 
existing systems or forced by user needs. 
Testing is very important to increase reliabil-
ity. It can be applied at different phases of 
the application development, starting right 
from the design stage, being the most im-
portant way of verifying the distributed ap-
plication.  
The causes leading to low reliability [3] of 
the distributed applications are generated by:  
-  weak design concepts caused by imma-
ture or inferior design concepts; 
-  escaping reliability problems that im-
pose higher service costs and design 
modifications; 
-  constrained human resources induced by 
inexperienced developing team; 
-  constrained prototypes caused by insuf-
ficient funding and development time; 
this is important to develop robustness 
and grow reliability and to obtain user 
feedback; 
-  overloaded resources leaving no reserve 
capacity for variations in demand; 
-  lack of attention to risk management 
when risks become actual problems to be 
solved, leading to delayed delivery 
dates; 
-  lack of flexibility in design that cause se-
rious consequences for schedules and 
costs; 
-  late changes in requirements leading to 
either late-arriving feedback from users 
or new expectations set by competitive 
entries; 
-  weak investment in early development 




force costly corrective actions in the lat-
er development phases.  
The challenges are to identify the results that 
are not acceptable and to establish their prior-
ities and their root causes. 
Non-reliability is obtained by [5]: 
-  using inadequate content; 
-  making operations with particular values 
which position the condition indicators 
such that further processing is impossi-
ble; 
-  altering the content of control variables 
which determines referring memory 
zones with random content. 
Distributed application developers must ap-
ply strict rules to eliminate the conditions for 
non-reliability, because most of the applica-
tion functional and security defects are relat-
ed to code quality which, if improved, will 
minimize undesired effects in reliability. 
In complex distributed software applications 
reliability problems are observed by decreas-
ing performance over time, and because ro-
bustness is the basis of reliability, a concen-
tration of the team members involved in the 
development process, to achieve the reliabil-
ity objectives, should be taken into account. 
Reliability for a distributed software applica-
tion requires good performance during opera-
tion, and not just being functional [3]. 
There are no perfect systems, but the goal is 
to increase its reliability and finding ways to 
improve performance, reliability being an es-
sential requirement for distributed software 
applications [6]. 
 
2 Reliability in data acquisition process 
Data acquisition is an important activity, with 
major influence in ensuring the data quality. 
The risks of errors in data acquisition process 
are related to data collection method. The da-
ta acquisition is achieved through the follow-
ing methods [8]: 
-  the input of data by operators using a 
keyboard;  
-  the taking over the data from various 
media, such as optical or magnetic; 
-  the taking over the static or moving im-
age from the camera or video camera; 
-  the reading of data by scanning the text, 
the images, the barcodes, and the mag-
netic stripe cards; 
-  the taking over the data by capturing the 
sound, using the microphone, or the ul-
trasound; 
-  the analog data collecting using a com-
bination of suitable devices. 
In the processes of data acquisition and 
monitoring is necessary to use information 
systems and devices to achieve: 
-  elimination of errors caused by human 
factors, such as errors in reading measur-
ing instruments, data transcription errors 
in primary documents, errors in reading 
of numbers and letters; 
-  human effort focusing on analysis and 
interpretation of data, which leads to in-
creased efficiency of human resources. 
The error represents the difference between 
actual and measured value of a certain char-
acteristic. The errors that occur in data acqui-
sition and data entry processes include: 
-  filling errors of primary documents con-
sisting of careless transcription, incom-
plete data transcripts, characters rever-
sals, replacing data with other, non-
compliance of the measurement unit; 
-  typing errors, such as confusion of let-
ters, numbers or characters; these errors 
are caused by inattention and mistakes of 
understanding; 
-  time errors are caused by delays oc-
curred between the time of data acquisi-
tion and data correction; delays that gen-
erates errors occur between the follow-
ing moments of time: 
o  acquisition - summarization;  
o  summarization - processing system 
input;  
o  input - displayed results;  
o  displayed results - stakeholder report-
ing;  
o  decision acknowledgment - decision 
implementation;  
-  errors that occur during the life cycle of 
data, caused by a correct value of data 
that became invalid over time. 
Errors in data production are caused mainly 
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ment of data production processes, issues that 
determine their poor quality. Causes of errors 
in compiling data [8] are presented in Table 
1.  
 
Table 1. Causes of errors in the data production 
Deficiency Causes  Fix 
different values for 
the same data 
multiple sources, occur-
rence of spurious data on 
the chain of transmission 
development of common definitions 
and consistent procedures, elimina-
tion of technical failures 
data  loss  systemic errors in data 
production 
statistical control of the processes, 
improvement of the processes, be-
havior control and proper incentives 
difficult data access 
in reasonable time 
large amount of stored in-
formation 
rewriting of the informatics applica-
tions using graphical user interface 








change of useful 
data 
changes in tasks of users 
and in organizational work 
environment 
anticipation, changes of the users’ 
tasks, review of processes and sys-
tems before the failures to determine 
the stop of informatics applications 
limited  data  access  insufficient calculation re-
sources, restrictive policy 
of informatics security 
policies development of policies 
modernization, so that consumers 
know when to expect more re-
sources 
 
Measures [9] implemented to prevent and eliminate errors in data are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Measures to prevent and eliminate data errors 
During data collection  During the input of data in 
the system of processing 
After the in-
put of data 
- design of primary documents 
- verification of completed documents 
- specialization and training of the staff 
- creation of the conditions for correct 
completion 
- ensure of optimum ratio between the 
volume of operations and the number 
of people participating at the collection 
and processing 
- taking over the correct data 
from the document 
-elimination of intermediaries  





Storing the same data in multiple locations is 
an error-prone source, because it is difficult 
to ensure a consistent update of all children, 
and should be avoided. 
Elimination of intermediate links in the chain 
of data entry in processing systems means 
eliminating of potential sources of input er-
rors. To achieve improved data quality, it is 
necessary to separate different aspects asso-
ciated with the data, such as intrinsic proper-
ties, acquisition systems and data delivery. 
Ways to increase the reliability of data acqui-
sition process is achieved by applying the 
following factors: 
•  human operators, by 




o  employees training;  
o  creating appropriate working conditions 
for data entry operators so that their at-
tention is solely focused on their activi-
ty; 
o  operators activities checking; 
o  appropriate wage and salary correlation 
with the number of errors made by the 
operator; 
•  equipment, by: 
o  choice of input data devices , having per-
formances appropriate to the correspond-
ing needs; 
o  equipment installation according to the 
norms and providing equipment quality 
service; 
o  equipment calibration; 
o  verification of equipment operation in 
normal operation. 
The complexity of software applications is 
given by a combination of factors whose in-
fluence is determined by the levels of quality 
characteristics. Complexity is studied in con-
junction with reliability, maintenance and 
stability. A great importance in this analysis 
is given to data quality. Due to the costs they 
incur in an organization, and that the poor 
quality of data causes large additional costs 
of processing, data quality is a priority for 
any successful management. 
 
3 Increasing system reliability through 
risk assessment 
Distributed applications encompass multiple 
physical or logical components, united by a 
common architecture and communicating 
through an array of heterogeneous environ-
ments. In this context the manner in which 
the system reacts to scenarios like the loss of 
component functionality or security threats 
represents an important aspect in addressing 
the issue of global system reliability. 
In order to provide an accurate model for 
predicting and improving a distributed appli-
cation’s threat response capabilities, the fol-
lowing factors are considered: 
-  application scope, or target domain, 
with effects like increased susceptibility 
to certain incidents or necessity for run-
ning and communicating under certain 
environments; 
-  component and global redundancy, the 
degree in which an incident affecting an 
individual node can prevent the proper 
functioning of another or of the whole; 
-  application users, specialized compo-
nents that are accessed by trained profes-
sionals are more reliable than general 
purpose ones, as the users are less sus-
ceptible to being a security concern; 
-  threat awareness in application design, 
or the manner in which the architectural 
features and component role target threat 
analysis and prevention; error handling, 
secure access to core functionalities, 
specialized tools in dealing with con-
cerning effects, incident logging capabil-
ities ranging from simple files to a spe-
cialized database. 
The current model considers a data acquisi-
tion module in the application, responsible 
for collecting raw data in various formats and 
storing it in both the initial form and in a re-
fined one derived through performing a se-
ries of operations meant to bring this infor-
mation to a common standard in order to help 
analysis. The application scope is ultimately 
testing, validating and refining risk assess-
ment models in the distributed systems envi-
ronment. 
To achieve a high level of reliability in the 
development cycle of distributed software 
applications, the following aspects should be 
taken into account: 
•  data source incompatibility – in order 
to correctly assess the risks, the raw 
data used in testing the models must 
allow for collecting sufficient com-
patible information, as shown below 
– numerical values included for ex-
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Table 3. Raw data compatibility 
Source 














Source A (audio)  —/1 0,1 0,01  ...  comp(A,K)  ...  0,5  0,5 
Source B (images)  0,1 —/1  0,05  ...  comp(B,K)  ...  0,1  0,1 
Source C (text)  0,01 0,05  —/1  ...  comp(C,K)  ...  0,001  0,001 
...  ... ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Source K (type K)  comp(A,K)  comp(B,K)  comp(C,K)   —/1   comp(N-
1,K) 
comp(N,K) 
...  ... ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Source N-1 (video)  0,5 0,1  0,001  ...  comp(N-
1,K) 
... —/1  1 
Source N (video)  0,5 0,1  0,001  ...  comp(N,K)  ...  1  —/1 
 
where: 
comp(X,Y) – the compatibility degree be-
tween the X and Y data sources, allowing for 
the existence of identical data types – as is 





 , ∀ X ≠ Y,s ∈ R,s ∈  0,1 
—/1, X = Y 
 (2) 
 




W=X  ⟺c o m p (X,Y) =c o m p (W,Y),∀Y   
(4) 
 
•  data quality inconsistence, a variation in 
the mentioned aspect even when consid-
ering the same data type, relating to the 
hardware device used through-out the 
collecting phase; the problem does not 
arise from the technical aspect but from 
the possible assessment errors caused by 
comparing two same-type sources and 
analyzing a variable quality amount of 
identifiable elements; the (4) property 
mentioned above is considered; 
•  unrepresentative model, as risk assess-
ment is by its nature a heterogeneous 
domain and there are no clear boundaries 
as to what the qualitative impact of a 
new model will be; in order to avoid this 
issue, clear information on the factors 
included in the model is required, as well 
as allowing for evolutionary components 
inside the model;   
•  natural information loss during the data 
collecting and refining stages. 
In order to avoid quality-related issues relat-
ing to data and algorithms used in the risk as-
sessment models the following steps are tak-
en: 
•  ensuring that meta-information acquired 
through analysis on a given medium en-
compasses only exogenous evolution 
factors, in relation to technical or contex-
tual aspects not included in the model; 
•  enlarging the raw information database, 
with effects in minimizing the error 
margins;  
•  the rigorous testing of the models; 
•  the development of an evolutionary algo-
rithm in order to help increase applica-
tion reliability and also serving as a risk 
assessment model; this approach is pre-
sented in the following sections. 
 
4 Emphasizing compatibility factor in the 
model 
A model for assessing the manner in which 
the system reacts or has reacted to individual 
incidents is composed of two logical areas: 
-  a  qualitative assessment of component 
behavior facing an array of identified 
threats, together with and influenced by 
a  quantitative statement of previous 
costs in removing the effects of inci-
dents; 
-  an evolutionary algorithm based on pre-
vious threat response assessment, which 




both as the source information for a new 
one and also as the benchmark to which 
this improvement is subjected. 
Considering the distributed system S, serving 
as a collection of n components, c, a number 
of m threats, t, composing the array T and an 
ordered array Q of individual component and 
threat-related  qualitative marks correspond-
ing to thresholds in the system owner’s cost 
analysis, as well as quantitative marks corre-
sponding to previous, calculated costs, 
brought down to scale, we compose the fol-
lowing: 
 
Table 4. Component/threat correlation 
S\T         …      
       ,ℎ        ,ℎ    …      ,ℎ    
            ,ℎ    
…  … …     … 
        
       ,ℎ       ,ℎ    …     ,ℎ   
 
where: 
n – number of components in the system; 
m – number of identified component-related 
threats; 
    – qualitative assessment mark corre-
sponding to threat j for component i; 
ℎ   – quantitative assessment mark corre-
sponding to threat j for component i; 
The value interval is defined as: 
    ∈     ,    ,…,      , ℎ   ∈   ,  , 
 ,   ∈   , 
having 
   ,    ,…,     – array of k qualitative 
marks; an example for k = 5 is {Very Bad, 
Bad, Average, Good, Very Good }; 
a, b – real, positive numbers defining costs 
broth to scale by reporting to a maximum 
considered loss –      . 
Calculating the scale index starts from the 
maximum defined loss value of      and the 
top limit of the scale: 
 
   =
    
   (5) 
 




   – scale index or, simply, system costs 
scale; 
     – the maximum registered or estimated 
cost caused by treating the system losses 
caused by an incident; 
e– the current stage or version in the evolu-
tion of the application reliability and risk as-
sessment model; 
   
 
( ) – the cost of removing the damage 
caused by a type j event in component i, con-
sidering recommendations or testing the 
model in the e stage. 
Any     
 
( ) cost is represented on the given 
scale as: 









        =   (8) 
 
The qualitative coefficients   are included 
in the model and relate to the estimated loss-
es caused by the occurrence of a given type 
of incident. They are included for events on 
whose behavior little is known on stage e and 
their relation to the quantitative coefficients 
is the following: 
 






    ,
    
   , =1
 
(   )∗    
  ,
 ∗    
   , =2, −1           
 
 ∗    
  ,  , = 
 (9) 
 
The relation between variables in Table 2 and 
coefficients is the following: 
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    =        ∈     , =1,       , =
1,         (10) 
ℎ   =   
 
( )
 , =1,       , =1,        ,∀ >0 
(11) 
Thus the problem of improving component 
or system reliability translates to the follow-
ing two objectives: 
•  minimizing incident-related costs; 
•  algorithm reevaluation. 
We consider    ( ) ∶T→E  a function de-
scribing the on cost values after applying the 
model in its e stage, otherwise formulated as 
envisioned by the model in its e-1 stage, E 
being the cost assumption collection and T 
the identified risk collection.  
 
   ( ) (    ,…   )=E ( ∑    
 
( )
   
    ,∑    
 
( )
   
    ,… ∑    
 
( )
   
    ) (12) 
 
or at component-level as: 
 
   ( )    =   
 
( )
 ,∀ =1,         (13) 
 
Increasing system reliability is, in the current 
scope, a consequence of an ever increasing 
efficiency in evaluating threat-related dam-
age. The used algorithms require the compo-
nent or system-wide minimization of the dis-
crepancies between predicted and measured 
behavior. 
The model’s efficiency condition is given by 
the following inequalities – for a given j in-
cident: 
   
 
( )
  <   
 
(   )
  ,∀ >0 (14) 
 
∑    
 
( )
   
    < ∑    
 
(   )
   
    ,∀ >0 (15) 
or for the i component as: 
   
 
( )
  <   
 
(   )
  ,∀ >0 (16) 
∑    
 
( )
   
    < ∑    
 
(   )
   
    ,∀ >0 (17) 
and system-wide as: 
∑∑   
 
( )
   
   
 
    < ∑∑   
 
(   )
   
   
 
    ,∀ >0 
(18) 
 
Estimating incident-generated losses is the 
result of applying the risk assessment models 
on primary data converted to an analysis 
compatible format. As the performance in 
analyzing behavior of the monitored process 
or component is partially dependent on ag-
gregating this information, the source com-
patibility coefficient must be included in the 
model. 
Component and threat-oriented cost assess-
ment generates the need for correlating each 
incident type with the compatibility of its da-
ta sources. Based on the information present-
ed in Tables 1 and 2 we identify this relation-
ship as taking the form exemplified below. 
Determining the representativeness of the K 
source of a given l type incident is done en-
compassing the representativeness of this in-
cident to the components using K as behavior 
data source. 
 
Table 5. The component – data source and incident type – data source correlations 
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...  ...  ...  ... ... ... ... ... 
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      X  X  X    
...  ... ... ...  ... ...  ...  ... 
             
 
Based on determining the compo-
nent/incident type and data source correla-
tions, the inter-source compatibility on a 
component or incident type axis, is intro-
duced into the model. 
Assessing costs including the compatibility 
component for the i node is given by: 
 
    
( )   =
    
( )
  
,∀ ≥0 (19) 
    
( ) =    
 
( ) ∗         
( ),    
( )   =    
 
( )
  ∗         
( ),∀ ≥0(20) 
     
( ) = ∏ comp 
 
       ,    ∈ 0,1 ,∀ ,  ,∀ ≥0(21) 
where: 
    - thex numbered data source, relevant to 
component i; 
    
( ),      
( )    – estimated costs for 
component i including the compatibility fac-
tor; 
     
( ) – the source compatibility coeffi-
cient for the i component, calculated as the 
product between individual coefficients for 
all uniquely associated, relevant data sources. 
Assessing costs including the compatibility 
component for the j threat type or incident is 
given by: 
 
     ( )
  =
    ( )
  
,∀ ≥0 (22) 
     ( ) =    
 
( ) ∗         ( ),     ( )
  =    
 
( )
  ∗         ( ),∀ ≥0(23) 
      ( )( )
= ∏ comp 
 
       ,    ∈ 0,1 ,∀ , ,∀ ≥0(24) 
where: 
    - thex numbered data source, relevant to 
incident type j; 
     ( ),       ( )
   – estimated costs for threat 
type j including the compatibility factor; 
      ( )– the source compatibility coeffi-
cient for the j threat type, calculated as the 
product between individual coefficients for 
all uniquely associated, relevant data sources. 
The (14) – (17) relations including the source 
compatibility aspect in a given incident type j 
are: 
 
     ( )
  <       (   )
  ,∀ >0,∀ =1,        (25) 
∑      ( )
   
    < ∑      (   )
   
    ,∀ >0(26) 
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( )   <       
(   )   ,∀ >0,∀ =
1,       (27) 
∑     
( )    
    < ∑     
(   )    
    ,∀ >
0(28) 
 
The (18) criterion, used to calculate cost evo-
lution on a global level, losses its corre-
spondence. In considering system-wide ef-
fects similar to the ones described by this 
formula, the (27) and (28) equations are suf-
ficient.  
The model’s performance is related to meet-
ing simultaneously or selectively the proper-
ties described above: 
 
Table 6. Efficiency criterion in risk assessment models based on increasing distributed 
applications reliability 










Increasing component I reliability     X     
Minimizing costs generated by incident type 
j 
X       
Minimizing costs generated by incident type 
j in component i 
X  X    
Increasing multiple component reliability   X      
Minimizing costs   X      
Model efficiency relating to application reli-
ability 
    X  
 
5 Conclusions 
The presented model is relevant to the as-
sessment of cost-measurable IT risks. It is 
extendable based on identifying additional 
factors such as recovery time or component 
grouping based on cascade vulnerability sus-
ceptibility. A supplementary advantage in ex-
tending the current model is the establish-
ment of qualitative to quantitative coefficient 
weights. Aggregating information is made 
based on the inter-coefficient relationship 
(9). 
Reliability in software development cycle has 
a very high impact in the maintenance pro-
cess. If techniques to improve reliability are 
correctly applied, the resources needed in the 
maintenance process decreases and the need 
for refactoring, that is a lot more difficult 
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